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Brass v. State, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 53 (July 25, 2013)1 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—SUBSTITUION OF PARTIES WHEN A PARTY DIES 




The Court considered whether an attorney may file a substantive motion on a deceased 
client's behalf in a criminal case when a personal representative has not been substituted 




The Court denied the motion, finding that counsel lacked the authority to act on the deceased 
client’s behalf.  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Ronnie Brass was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping and first-degree 
murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Mr. Brass timely appealed, but he died before his 
appeal was decided. Counsel suggested Mr. Brass’s death upon the record almost one year prior 





Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court, sitting as a seven-justice panel with Chief 
Justice Pickering and Justices Gibbons, Hardesty, Parraguirre, Cherry, and Saitta, who concurred.  
 
First, the Court addressed the issue of whether an attorney may file a substantive motion on a 
deceased client’s behalf in a criminal case when a personal representative has not been 
substituted as a party to the appeal. Generally, “counsel cannot act on a deceased client’s 
behalf.”2 If a party dies, “the [action] cannot proceed until someone is substituted for the 
decedent.”3 Accordingly, because a personal representative had not been substituted as a party to 
the appeal, the Court concluded counsel lacked the authority to act on the deceased client’s 
behalf.  
 
Second, the Court addressed the time frame for substitution under NRAP 43(a)(1). Although 
NRAP 43(a)(1) allows for the substitution of a personal representative for a deceased party while 
an appeal is pending, it does not establish a limitation on the time for filing a substitution motion.  
However, because NRCP 25(a), which governs the substitution of parties when a party dies in a 
civil case, requires that a substitution motion be filed within 90 days of the decedent’s death 
being suggested upon the record, the Court concluded that a motion under NRAP 43 must also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  By Katelyn J Cantu. 
2  Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962 (4th Cir. 1985).  
3  Walker v. Burkham, 68 Nev. 250, 253-54, 229 P.2d 158, 160 (1951).	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be filed within 90 days of the decedent’s death being suggested upon the record. In both cases, if 
the substitution in not timely filed, then the action will be dismissed as to the deceased party.  
 
Nevertheless, the Court, in this instance only, extended the time for filing the substitution motion 
until 90 days after the opinion was filed because the Court’s process caused the delay in filing 




The Court DENIED counsel’s motion for abatement, finding that the motion was not properly 
before the Court.  
